The gap between hype and reality in robotics is getting thinner. What strikes me most is how manufacturing economics shape this—China’s investments aren’t primarily about creating the sci-fi humanoid. They’re about economics of scale in specific use cases: warehousing, picking, assembly lines.

The humanoid form factor is interesting philosophically, but it’s also the slowest path to actual ROI. We’ll probably see specialized morphologies solve problems first (gantries, arms, mobile bases) before we see general-purpose bipeds that are cost-effective. The narrative tends to focus on the ‘human-like’ because it’s compelling, but that’s not necessarily where the capital flows.

When I pressed him to consider the social consequences of his work, he acknowledged that he and his business partners had discussed contingency plans for laid-off workers. Those who are higher-skilled could be used to train the next generation of robots, he said. He did not say how he would deal with lower-skilled workers.

As government subsidies flood the robotics sector, Chen and his peers are bracing for the usual pattern: price wars and cost cutting manoeuvres that leave companies barely able to turn a profit.

I’m curious as to what’s at the end of this race to the bottom. If workers are steadily being excluded from the job market, and even those running the companies are being forced to narrow their profit margins, the implied goal is to make a lot of stuff that nobody has time or money to use. I guess there’s some competitive advantage of economic dominance on the world stage, but it feels like even that is on shaky ground for one reason or another.

Soon, no one in China will have a job.